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N February 2, 1984, the Federal Reserve enacted
a system of contemporaneous reserve requirements
(CRR) to replace the system of lagged reserve require-
ments (LRR) that had been in effect since September
1968. The Fed made this change in response to wide-
spread criticism that, under a reserve target operating
procedure, LRR made it more difficult to control the
monetary aggregates and contributed to the volatility
of money and, perhaps, interest rates. Thus, critics
believed areturn to CRR would reduce the volatility of
money and might reduce the volatility of interest rates
as well.’
The purpose of this article is to determine whether
the return to CRR has had, so far, any significant im-
pact on the variability of money and interest rates. The
article begins with a concise review of the arguments
bearing on the presumed effects of the change from
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‘See Thornton (1983b) and the references cited there.
LRR to CRR on the volatility of money or interest rates.
The actual behavior of these variables is then exam-
ined to see whether- arguments in favorofthereturn to
CR8 have been supported.
WHAT CHR IS SUPPOSED TO
ACCOMPLISH: THE STANDARD
ANALYSIS
The rationale for returning to CRR rests primarily on
the argument that l,RR weakens the contemporane-
ous link between reserves and deposits of depository
institutions. For example, it was argued that deposi-
tory institutions would have no incentive to curtail
their lending activities under LRR because they are not
required to hold reserves against the deposits that
these activities create until the following week. Conse-
quently, an increase in loan demand would be more
readily transmitted into a change in the money stock
in the short run under LRR.
At amore formal level, the case for CR11 was usually
presented in terms of the supply of and demand for
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argued that the money supply schedule is flatter un-
der LRR than under CR11. This is illustrated infigures 1
and 2. Consequently, random variation in the demand
for money represented by the shaded area in figure Il
results in more var-iability in the stock of money and
less variability in the interest rate under’ LRR, as illus-
trated in figure 1.Also, random variation in thesupply
of money represented by the shaded areas in figure 2)
results in more variabilit in money and interest rates
under 1,811. Thus, compared with CRR. LRR produces
greater variation in the money stock. Whether interest
rates are also more variable depends on the relative
magnitude of the variance of the supply-side and de-
mand-side disturbances.’
An Alternative Analysis of What to
Expect under CRR
There are two reasons why the result predicted
above need not occur. First, depository institutions’
behavior may not be as sensitive to the reserve ac-
counting system in effect as this analysis suggests.
Consequently, the switch from LRR to CRR may not
significantly alter the week-to-week variability of
‘There are other factors, not considered here, that also affect the
outcome; see Thornton (1983b) and the references cited there.
money and interest rates, at least in the short run.
Second, the suggested outcome is predicated on the
assumption that the Federal Reserve is targeting on a
reserve aggregate. Ifthe Federal Reserve is not target-
ing explicitly on money or a reserve aggregate in the
short run, the variability of money and interest rates
will not necessarily be related to the reserve account-
ing system.
The first view argues that the short-mn contempo-
raneous link between depository institutions’ deci-
sions to make additional loans and investments and
their holdings of reserves need not beclose even under
a system ofCRR.’ In the short run, depository institu-
tions can obtain additional reserves by borrowing
from the Federal Reserve or holding temporarily fewer
excess reserves than they would hold otherwise.
These factors maybe sufficient to accommodate most
short-run, week-to-week supply- and demand-side
disturbances. Consequently, the slopes of the money
supply schedules under LRR or CRR may be similar.
Unless the adoption of CRR fundamentally changes
the way that depository institutions adjust their re-
serve positions, there may be no dramatic change in
the volatility of money and interest rates in the short
run.
‘See Thornton (1983b) for a moredetailed explanation of the argu-








money. Within this framework, theproponents of CR11
PA,
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This conjecture is likely to be even more valid given
that the new CR8 system lengthened the reserve set-
tlement period from one to two weeks.’ Depository
institutions may now make loans early in the account-
ing period, waiting to settle (through the discount
window, the money market or changes in excess re-
serves) toward the end ofthe period. By accommodat-
ing loan demand at the first part of the period and
settling later in the period, week-to-week variability in
money and interest rates could be similar under’ the
new system of CR11 and the old system of LRR.’
The Role ofFederal Resen’e Operating
Procedures
Expectations ofdifferential effects in the var’iability
of money and interest rates under CR11 and LRR are
based on the assumption that the Federal Reserve is
attempting to hit amonetary target by manipulating a
reserve aggregate. Ifthis is not the case, there is little
reason to expect differential effects associated with a
change in the reserve accounting system. For exam-
ple, week-to-week variability of money and interest
rates are unaffected by the choice of reserve account-
ing system under an interest rate targeting procedure.’
This point is important because the Federal Reserve
changed operating procedures in the fall of 1982,
about ayear and a half befom’e the implementation of
CRR. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMCI
followed a reserve aggregate targeting procedure that
placed greater emphasis on movements in Ml as a
policy guide from October 6, 1979, to early October
1982.’ Since then, the FOMC has placed less emphasis
on thebehavior of Ml in the short run, ainung instead
at longer-run monetary and credit aggregate objec-
tives. This policy has been implemented in the short
‘For a discussion of the newsystem, see Gilbert and Trebing (1982).
For an interesting analysis of the carryover provision of the new
system of CRR, seeSpindt and Tarhan (1984).
~Some have suggested that the Federal Reserve has no choice but
toaccommodate this credit expansion, since the additionalreserves
needed to support the newdeposits can only come into the system
via the discount window. This argument comes perilously close to
saying that the FederalReserve must accommodatecredit demand
completely under LRR. This position, however, ignores the dy-
namics of these long-run adjustments. For another view of this
process, see Thomton (1982), p. 29.
‘The short-run money supply schedule is completely flat (interest’
elastic). Thus, the variability of money would be completely deter-
mined by the random variation in the demand for money, and this
would be unaffected by the reserve accounting system.
‘For a discussion oftheissues surrounding the decision todeempha-
sizeMl as an intermediate target, see Thornton (1983a).
run through a “flexible nonborrowed-reserves path.”
Asaresult of this procedural change, the variability of
money and interest rates immediately before and after
the implementation of CR11 may reveal little change.
HAS THE VARIABILITY OF MONEY
AND INTEREST RATES CHANGED
SINCE CRR?
Before a comparison of the weekly variability of
money and interest rates for periods before and after
the adoption of CR11 can be made, one must decide
what measure of variability to use. The measure used
here is the aver-age absolute percentage change
(AAPC).’ This is prefer’able to two more commonly
cited measures, the standard deviation and the coef-
ficient of variation, as a measure of the short-run,
week-to-week variability that this article is concerned
with (see the insert on page 30).
Data are presented for various subperiods to reflect
both the move fl’om LRR to CR11 and the change in
Federal Reserve operating procedures. Data for the
two weeks immediately before and after the imple-
mentation of CRR were excluded to guard against the
possibility that they were contanunated by expecta-
tions or other problems associated with the imple-
mentation ofthe new procedure.
Results for the money stock, Ml, are presented in
table 1. The AAPC ofseasonally adjusted Ml appears
to have increased significantly in the 28-week period
following the implementation of CR11, compared with
that of the 28-week period immediately before CR11.
The AAPC of seasonally adjusted Ml incm’eased from
about 0.13 pet-cent to 0.43 percent, adifference that is
significant at the 5 percent level.” When the most re-
cent period is compared with asimilar period in 1983,
the increase is much smaller; nevertheless, it is statis-
tically significant.”
These comparisons, however, are deceptive be-
cause revised seasonally adjusted data is “smoother”
than preliminary seasonally adjusted data. Thus, the
significant increase in the variability of seasonally ad-
‘Wallich (1984), p. 26. Also, see Solomon (1984).
T
‘The ,4.APC is defined asAAPC(X) = (1 /(T—1)) ~
t” 1
(] X,—X,_, /X,_,)l00. It is a measure of relative variability in that
AAPC (10<) AAPC(X), where k is an arbitrary constant.
“The t-statisticis 5.20.
“The t-statistic is 3.15.
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This is investigated by a comparison of the AAPC
over the three periods using either not seasonally ad-
justed or fia’st-published seasonally adjusted data. If
the increased variability is primarily the result of the
seasonal adjustment revision rather than the change
in the reserve accounting system, then the AAPC for
the first-published or not seasonally adjusted Ml
should be essentially the same over these periods.”
Likewise, a comparison of not seasonally adjusted
data forthe 28-week period since the implementation
of CR11 and the corresponding period a year earlier
should reveal no change in the AAPC. The data are
consistent with both of these conditions. Thus, there
appears to be no change in the variability of Ml be-
tween the pre- and post-CRR periods.
It is indeterminant, however’, whether this result
stems fa’om depository institutions not changing their
behavior following the enactment of CR11 or from a
change in the operating procedur’e in the fall of 1982.
In order to determine which explanation is more con-
sistent with the facts, the AAPCwas calculated for Ml
and three interest rates — the federal funds rate, the
three-month Treasury bill rate and the commercial
paper rate — for the three-year period of reserve ag-
gregate targeting (October 17, 1979, to September 29,
1982) and for’ the year’ immediately following the
change in the Federal Reserve’s operating procedure
(October 6, 1982, to September 28, 1983). These results
are presented in table 2.The data indicate a decline in
the AAPC for’ both revised and first-published Ml after
the fall of1982;however, this decline is not statistically
significant at the 5 percent level.” Thus, it, appears
there was no significant change in the week-to-week
variability ofMl following the change in theoperating
procedures.
The AA.PCs for all three inter’est rates, however, de-
crease significantly after the fall of 1982. Thus, it ap-
pears that the change in operating procedure had
some impact on the behavior ofinterest rates. Hence,
“Forexample, see Hem and Ott (1983).
“Acomparison ofthese data is perhapsmore relevant because these
are the figures that economic agents and policymakers use tomake
their decisions.
“The relevant t-statistics for first-published and not seasonally ad-
justed data are 0.91 and 0.15, respectively.
justed Ml with the implementation of CR11 may be a
statistical artifact of the seasonal adjustment re-
vision”
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it is possible that the lack ofasignificant change in the
variability of money after the implementation of CR11
wasdue to theearlier’ change in operating procedures.
Unfortunately, these results cannot rule out thepossi-
bility that the short-run reserve management behavior’
by depository institutions is simply insensitive to
changes in the reserve accounting system.”
The Variability ofInterest Rates
The AAPC was calculated for the federal funds, the
three-month Treasury bill and the 30-day commercial
paper’ t’ate for’ comparable 28-weekperiods before and
after- the implementation of CR11. The results, which
are reported in table 3. indicate aslight increase in the
“Neitherofthese, however, rules out other potential gains from CRR.
See Goodfriend (1984).
AAPC for the federal funds rate for- periods immedi-
atelv beforeand after thermplem ntation ofCR11 and a
slight decr-ease for both the Fr easurv bill rate and the
commer’cial papir rate; howevcr, none of these wet-c
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31significant at the 5 percent level.” Thus, the results
suggest that the implementation of CR11 had little ef-
fect on the variability of money or interest rates. The
significant reduction in inter’est rate variability ap-
pears to correspond with theearlier change in operat-
ing procedures, not with the implementation of CRR.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this article was to take an ear-I look
at the effect of the Federal Reserve’s new system of
contemporaneous r’eserveaccounting on the variabil-
ity of money and interest rates. Although the CR11
system was adopted with the expectation that it
would reduce the variability of money under a reserve
targeting procedure, it may not have that effect for two
reasons. First, depository institutions may behave in
waysthat reduce the short-run contemporaneous link
between aggregate reserves arid deposits even under’
CR11. Second, the change in operating procedures in
October- 1982 may have preempted any potential
benefits from the switch in accounting systems.
‘The data for Ml indicate that there was no signifi-
cant change in week-to-week variability following ei-
ther the change in operating pr’ocedure in October
1982 or the adoption of CR11. The variability of short-
run interest rates declined significantly after’ the
change in operating procedures, but has been unaf-
fected by the implementation of CR11. ‘I’hus, the
change in the reserve accounting procedui-e had no
statistically significant impact on the variability of
money either because depository institutions’ lending
and investment decisions are insensitive to the r’eserve
accounting system. or because of the change in oper-
ating procedures that occur-red some year and a half
earlier. Consequently, CRR’s potential usefulness in
reducing the variability of money can be deter-mined
for certain only if the Federal Reserve implements a
strict reserve aggregate or monetary base target.
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